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ABSTRACT 
The evolutionary game of co-opetition relationship between regional logistics nodes is studied in this paper. A 
replicator dynamic model is built to obtain the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) of the game. Then, according to the 
status and level of logistics nodes, the symmetric and asymmetric game models based on evolutionary game theory 
are proposed, respectively. The former is used to analyze the changing trends of co-opetition relationship between 
logistics nodes from a same layer of a logistics network. While the latter can be used to deal with the relationship 
forecasting problems between logistics nodes from different layers. The result of the case study reveals that the 
proposed models have good practicability and accuracy in dealing with the relationship forecasting problems within a 
regional logistics network. 
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1. Introduction 
Regional logistics network design plays an 
important role in logistics research, which will 
improve the benefit of governments, enterprises 
and consumers. As we have known, a regional 
logistics network is mainly composed of many 
logistics nodes and transport corridors. The study 
on relationship between logistics nodes is 
significant for the regional logistics network design. 
In real world, a logistics node can be a city, a 
logistics enterprise, a logistics park, a distribution 
center and so on. Logistics nodes in a logistics 
network always build logistics infrastructures 
together and share the transport resources, 
logistics demands and logistics information. The 
competition or cooperation development strategy 
taken by a logistics node will be changed at 
different times. Thus, the evolutionary game 
analysis of competition and cooperation 
relationship between logistics nodes is very 
important to the development of regional logistics 
network. 
 
Some achievements on the layout planning of 
logistics nodes and enterprise logistics network 
design have been made in recent years. In early 
studies, Schönsleben [1] proposed partnership 
strategies towards logistics networks, and revealed  
 
 
that the duration and intensity of cooperation within 
a logistics network would cause different 
consequences. Tang et al. [2] discussed the 
integrated decisions for logistics network in a 
global manufacturing system based on heuristic 
algorithms. A two-layer integrated decision model 
(APLS-M and TOQ-M) was solved by an 
assignment heuristic and a transportation heuristic, 
and the simulation results indicated their method 
was effective. In order to solve logistics node 
dynamic service range division and the logistics 
node layout optimization problem, Wang and Feng 
[3] established a regional logistics node layout 
optimization model, based on weighted Voronoi 
diagram and the discrete generation algorithm. 
They provided a new research idea to the logistics 
node relationship study. An approach based on the 
Shapley value concept from cooperative game 
theory was presented by Reyes [4], which 
exhibited better effect in maintaining stable 
conditions in the logistics network. What’s more, 
this paper showed that the game theory was 
effective in dealing with logistics network problems. 
Feng et al. [5] proposed a regional logistics 
network based on hub-and-spoke network model 
to strengthen the promotion of the regional 
logistics towards the regional economic 
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development. In the study, principal component 
analysis was applied to determine the level of the 
nodes in the proposed logistics network. A case 
study from Hubei province was presented to verify 
the feasibility of the proposed theory. Jenþek and 
Twrdy [6] provided a methodology for transport 
logistics analysis of regional intermodal transport 
logistics terminals. By using this method, the 
accurate location of terminal nodes can be 
determined. Zheng and Liang [7] built up a 
planning model of logistics nodes considering the 
supply chain conditions, and a practical 
mathematical modeling framework was further 
suggested. A logistics network nodes planning and 
development strategy was described by Cao [8], 
and a logistics network in Henan province was 
taken as an example. In the work, a four-layer 
logistics network was designed. Opetuk et al. [9] 
focused on the energy consumption, materials 
consumption, pollution and waste caused by 
logistics activities, and some solutions for how to 
reduce the emission and increase the efficiency of 
logistics network were given.  
 
In micro-logistics research field, many researchers 
conducted investigations in the logistics node 
development strategy study. Bruzzone et al. [10] 
focused on the development of a new simulator of 
micro activities in a logistics node, which could 
extend the capabilities of a logistics node over its 
current capabilities effectively. Liu et al. [11] 
considered the flexibility value of enterprise’s 
logistics capability, and their model avoided the 
disadvantages of traditional finance method, such 
as ignoring the intangible value calculation of 
logistics capability investment. A seamless 
intermodal distribution solution to the port 
hinterland container logistics of a regional logistics 
system was explored by Lannone [12]. In the 
paper, numbers of conditions were investigated to 
achieve private and social cost efficiency in the 
landside distribution, and the results obtained by 
the simulations can be used as a helpful reference 
for public policy makers. A multiagent model of the 
container terminal event management problem 
was provided by Lorena et al. [13] and it could 
reduce the logistics cost and enhance the 
competitiveness of a container terminal. Cedillo-
Campos and Sanchez-Ramirez [14] presented a 
dynamic logistics performance assessment model 
on supply chains operating, and their research 
results could provide a decision support aid to 
node enterprises of a supply chain. Ding et al. [15] 
aimed at establishing the analysis and forecast 
diagnosis models for competitiveness of logistics 
enterprise based on support vector machine 
theory. In their investigation, they regarded an 
enterprise as a node of the logistics network.  
 
In the evolutionary game theory research, 
Cleveland and Ackleh [16] attempted to find a 
comprehensive mathematical framework to solve 
the nonlinear evolutionary game theoretic models, 
which supported the establishments of our 
symmetric game model and asymmetric game 
model. And Veloz et al. [17] illustrated their 
framework by modeling the repeated prisoners' 
dilemma, their model is built from the payoff matrix 
together with assumptions of the agents' memory 
and recognizability capacities. We also use these 
assumptions in our paper as preconditions.  
 
However, little literatures can be found about the 
topic of relationship analysis between regional 
logistics nodes. In the research, we forecast the 
relationship development tendency of logistics 
nodes and present a symmetric game model and 
an asymmetric game model to investigate the 
competition or cooperation strategy chosen by 
logistics nodes within a regional logistics network. 
This paper is organized as follows. As the basic 
preparation, in section 2, we will construct a 
replicator dynamic model first. Then in section 3 
we will build a symmetric evolution game model 
and an asymmetric evolution game model of 
regional logistics nodes respectively. In section 4, 
a case study of the new Eurasian Continental 
Bridge logistics network will be given to show the 
performance of the models proposed in the paper. 
And in section 5, a conclusion will be made. 
 
2. Problem description and evolution game 
theory 
 
2.1 The co-opetition relationship of regional 
logistics nodes 
 
Cooperation-competition is a strategy combining 
cooperation strategy with competition strategy. It is 
a kind of game behavior which will make the player 
gain more benefits. Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
[18] combined competition with cooperation into a 
new area, and named it “co-opetition” in their book 
Co-opetition. They thought that the business 
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activities were not only a special game, but also a 
non-zero-sum game which can achieve a win-win 
situation.  
 
In a multi-layer regional logistics network, the 
logistics nodes will share the customer 
requirement, logistics information, logistics income, 
transport resources, warehousing resources, and 
so on. A schematic diagram of a regional logistics 
system is shown in Figure 1. Co-opetition behavior 
exists between logistics nodes from a same layer 
(within the shaded area A shown in Figure 1) or 
from different layers (within the shaded areas B 
and C). During the development process of the 
logistics network, some logistics nodes will choose 
cooperation strategy, some of them will select 
competition strategy, and others maybe adjust 
their management strategy constantly. The 
achievements of this investigation provide 
theoretical basis for the strategy selection of 
logistics nodes. 
 
2.2 Replicator dynamics model 
 
In early game theory models, players were 
assumed to be perfect rationality. Although 
theoretically useful, this behavioral assumption on 
the other hand is extreme and unrealistic. 
Significant efforts have been made to improve the 
realism of behavioral assumptions adopted in game 
theory models, i.e., the evolutionary game theory 
(EGT) model. With different status and positions of 
players in the game, the game theory model can be 
divided into symmetric game model and asymmetric 
game model. In 1982, John Maynard Smith 
introduced the concept of “Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy (ESS)” in his book Evolution and the 
Theory of Games to reveal the dynamic mechanism 
of behavior changes in animal groups. So, in order 
to find the ESS of the game, we will build a 
replicator dynamics model first. 
 
In repeated games, it is assumed that the players 
are divided into two groups and each of them only 
can choose one pure strategy at a time 
(cooperation strategy or competition strategy). The 
notations throughout the paper are defined as 
follows: is  represents the strategy i  chosen by a 
player; ^ `1 2, , ,i iS s s s   represents the strategy set 
composed of alternative strategies, where i is S ; 
 t in s  means the number of players choosing pure 
strategy is  at the moment t ;  t ix s  is the rate of 
the players who choose strategy is  at the moment 
t  in the group;      ^ `1 2, , ,t t t ix x s x s x s   represents 
the status of the group at the moment t . 
 
 Figure 1. Schematic diagram of a regional logistics system.  
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Then we can get the equation: 
 
( ) ( ) / ( )
i
t i t i t
r S
x s n s n r

 ¦    (1) 
 
The anticipated expense of player i  choosing 
strategy is  at the moment t  is: 
 
( , ) ( ) ( , )
i
t i t t i
r S
f s x x r f s r

 ¦    (2) 
 
where ( , )t if s r  represents the anticipated expense 
of player i  who chooses strategy is  when other 
players choose the strategy r . The average 
anticipated expense of the group is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( , )
i i
t t i t i
s S
f x x s f s x

 ¦    (3) 
 
In the game, players will make a judgment on their 
benefits after each game process. Then the players 
with lower income will learn from the ones with 
higher income and adjust their management 
strategies. The proportion of player type is a 
function of the time which depends on the learning 
speed. The numerical value of the proportion of 
player type equals the derivative of player type 
proportion with respect to t [16]. Then we can get 
the differential equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( , )t i t i t i
dn s n s f s x
dt
                                        (4) 
 
According to Eq. 1, we can get: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
i i
t i t i t
t t i
r S r S
dn s dx s dn rn r x s
dt dt dt 
   ¦ ¦            (5) 
 
Combining Eq. 4 with Eq. 5, we obtain: 
 
( ) [ ( ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( , )] / ( )
i i
t i
t i t i
t i t t t
r S r S
dx s n s f s x
d t
x s n r f r x n r
 
  
 ¦ ¦
                   (6) 
 
Simplifying Eq. 6 with the combination of Eq. 3, it 
follows that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )t i tt i t i
dx s x s f s x f x
dt
ª º  ¬ ¼   (7) 
 
Eq. 7 is the differential form of the replicator 
dynamic model. Let ( ) 0t idx s
dt
 , then all steady 
states of replicator dynamics can be gained. A 
steady state ( )t ix s
  is an ESS only when it has 
stability to small sample perturbations and satisfies 
the following conditions: if ( ) ( )t i t ix s x s
 , there is 
( )( ) 0t idx sF x
dt
 ! ; if ( ) ( )t i t ix s x s! , there is 
( )( ) 0t idx sF x
dt
  . According to the stability theorem 
for differential equation, the derivative '( )F x of the 
steady state F(x) should be less than zero. 
 
3._Symmetric game model and asymmetric 
game model 
 
According to the different positions of players, the 
game theory model can be classified into 
symmetric game model and asymmetric game 
model. Based on the assumptions in section 3.1, 
we will build a symmetric evolution game model 
and an asymmetric evolution game model of 
regional logistics nodes respectively, in section 3.2 
and section 3.3. 
 
3.1 Basic assumptions 
 
 It is assumed that there are two types of groups in 
the game: group I and group II. Players from group 
I has i pure strategies s1, s2,ǜǜǜ, si ; while players 
from group II has j pure strategies s1, s2,ǜǜǜ, sj . The 
strategy spaces can be defined as: 
1 2
1
{( , , , ) : 1}
i
i i n
n
S D D D D
 
     ¦ , 
1 2
1
{( , , , ) : 1}
j
j j m
m
S E E E E
 
     ¦ , in which Įi and ȕj 
represent the probability of players will choose 
corresponding strategies, respectively. The payoff 
function of group I is D E( , )i i jf , and for group II is 
( , )j i jf D E , where ( , )i i jf D E  and  ( , )j i jf D E  depend on the 
strategy profile ( , )i js s . In the symmetric game 
model, ones obtain that Įi=ȕj, i=j, and n=m. The 
symmetric game can be described as  
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^ `; ,i i i jG S f D D . Maynard Smith (1982) defined: 
when the strategy iD   meets the optimal reaction 
conditions (8) and (9), the strategy iD  is a 
symmetric game ESS. In a similar way, we can also 
get the ESS of the asymmetric game model. 
 
( , ) ( , ),i i i i j i j if f S
  t  Į Į Į Į Į                              (8) 
 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
                    
                     
i j i i i i i i j i j j
j i
f f f f   

t  t
 z
Į Į Į Į Į Į Į Į
Į Į
               (9) 
 
Basic assumptions of these models are as follows: 
 
a) The rate of logistics nodes from group I choose 
cooperation strategies is x (0 1xd d ), and the rate 
of competition strategies is 1-x. The rate of 
logistics nodes from group II select cooperation 
strategy is y (0 1yd d ), and the rate of competition 
strategy is 1-y. In the symmetric game model, the 
logistics nodes come from the same type of group, 
we have x=y. 
 
a) The logistics incomes of logistics node A and 
logistics node B are I1 and I2 (assuming I1>I2), 
respectively, when they don’t cooperate with each 
other. The expected increased logistics income 
after they using cooperation strategies is ǻI. The 
parameter “profit sharing rate”  (0 1)d dǔ ǔ  is 
introduced to control the distribution of the 
additional benefit ǻI. Then, the additional income 
of node A which caused by cooperation is ȦǻI and 
the one of node B is (1-Ȧ)ǻI. 
 
a) We assume that the investments for cooperation 
of Node A and Node B are M1 and M2 (M1>0, 
M2>0, M1>M2), respectively. In the symmetric 
game model, it is assumed that there is only one 
type of group in the game, and we have i j Į ǃ , 
( , ) ( , )i i j j i jf f Į ǃ Į ǃ , I1=I2,  , and M1=M2. 
 
3.2 Symmetric game model of logistics nodes 
 
The players in the symmetric game come from the 
one type of group (a same layer in the logistics 
network), which means that the players are without 
differences in the activities during the game 
process. Based on the assumptions above, the 
symmetric cooperative game payoff matrix 
between node A and node B is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Logistics Node B 
cooperation competition 
Logistics 
Node A 
cooperation I+ȦǜǻI-M I+(1-Ȧ)ǜǻI-M 
I-M 
I 
competition I I-M 
I 
I 
 
Table 1. Symmetric cooperative game  
payoff matrix between nodes A and B. 
 
According to Table 1, when the profit sharing rate is 
Ȧ=1/2, the expected payoff for cooperation strategy 
is: 
 
1 ( / 2 ) (1 ) ( )f x I I M x I M  '                             (10) 
 
The expected payoff for competition strategy is: 
 
2 (1 )f x I x I                                                   (11) 
 
The average expected payoff of the group is: 
 
1 2(1 )f x f x f                                                   (12) 
 
According to Eq. 7, the replicator dynamics 
equation is: 
 
1
1( ) (1 )( )
2
dx x f f x x x I M
dt
     '                       (13) 
 
Let 0dx
dt
 , then 1 0x  , 2 1x  , 3 / 2
Mx
I
  ' , which 
means that the imitator replicator dynamics has 
three steady states at most. 
 
(1) When / 2M I ' , 3 [0,1]/ 2
Mx
I
  ' ; for 
*
1
2
2 0
x x
d x
dt  
 , 
*
2
2
2 0
x x
d x
dt  
 , 1x  and x*2  are 
asymptotically stable points and 3x  is the saddle 
point. The changing trend of imitator dynamic 
evolution is shown in Figure 2. 
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dx
dt
x
1x

2x

0
3x

/ 2
M
I' 1
 
 
Figure 2. Changing trends of co-opetition  
relationship in symmetric game model. 
 
If the initial value of x is between 1 3( , )x x   at the 
beginning of the gambling, the replicator dynamics 
of the group will tend to the steady state x*1 , and 
there will be more and more logistics nodes 
emulating competition strategies. Thus, the 
relationship between the logistics nodes will trend 
to competition. If x is between 3 2( , )x x  , the 
replicator dynamics of the group will tend to the 
steady state 2x  , and there will be more and more 
logistics nodes emulating cooperation strategies. 
Therefore, the relationship between the logistics 
nodes will trend to beneficial cooperation.  
 
(2) When / 2M I! ' , 3 [0,1]/ 2
Mx
I
  ' , and 3x
  is 
insignificance. The system only has two stable 
states at most: 1x  and 2x . According to the 
stability theorem for differential equation, 1x  is an 
asymptotically stable point, while 2x
  is an 
instability point. In this case, there is only one 
stable point 1 0x
  , which means that the scale of 
the logistics nodes selecting cooperation strategies 
is zero. All the logistics nodes will choose 
competition strategy. The relationship between 
logistics nodes will eventually tend to competition. 
 
(3) When / 2M I ' , 3 2 1x x   , singularities 3x  and 
2x
  become one point. In this case, the changing 
trends of the system will be the same as in 
condition (2). That is, when the investment is equal 
to the additional benefit earned by the cooperation, 
the players in two sides will also give up 
cooperation gradually. Thus, the relationship of 
them will tend to competition. 
 
 
 
3.3 Asymmetric game model of logistics nodes 
 
Different from the symmetric game model, in the 
asymmetric one, the logistics nodes come from 
different layers of the logistics network. Based on 
the assumptions in section 3.1, the asymmetric 
cooperative game payoff matrix of node A and 
node B is shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Logistics node B 
cooperation competition 
Logistics 
node A 
cooperation I1+ȦǜǻI-M1 I2+(1-Ȧ)ǜǻI-M2 
I1-M1 
I2 
competition I1 I2-M2 
I1 
I2 
 
Table 2.  Asymmetric cooperative game  
payoff matrix between nodes A and B. 
 
According to Table 2, the expected payoff for 
cooperation strategy of logistics node A from group 
I is: 
 
11 1 1 1 1( ) (1 ) ( )f y I I M y I MZ   '                      (14) 
 
The expected payoff for competition strategy of 
logistics node A is: 
 
12 1 1(1 )f y I y I                                              (15) 
 
The average expected payoff of the group I is:  
 
 
1 11 12(1 )f x f x f                                                  (16) 
 
According to Eq. 7, the replicator dynamics 
equation of group I is: 
 
11 1
1
( )
    
(1 )( )
dx x f f
dt
x x y I MZ
 
    '                                    (17) 
 
The expected payoff for cooperation strategy of 
logistics node B from group II is: 
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21 2 2 2 2( (1 ) ) (1 ) ( )f x I I M x I MZ     '            (18) 
 
The expected payoff for competition strategy of 
logistics node B is: 
 
22 2 2(1 )f x I x I                                                    (19) 
 
The average expected payoff of the group II is:  
 
2 21 22(1 )f y f y f                                              (20) 
 
According to Eq. 7, the replicator dynamics 
equation of group II is: 
 
21 2
2
( )
(1 )( (1 ) )
dy y f f
dt
y y x I MZ
 
    '                                   (21) 
 
Let 0dx
dt
  and 0dy
dt
 , then five singularities can be 
gained: 1 (0,0)z
  , 2 (0,1)z   , 3 (1,0)z  , 4 (1,1)z  ,
2 1
5 ( , )(1 )
M Mz
I IZ Z
    '  ' . By solving
2
2
d x
dt
and
2
2
d y
dt
 
separately, we have 
2
12 (1 2 )( )
d x x y I M
dt
Z    '  and 
2
22 (1 2 )[ (1 ) ]
d y y x I M
dt
     ' ǔ . Then, let 2
2 0
d x
dt
  
and 
2
2 0
d y
dt
 , we can get the solutions: x1=1/2 and 
y1=1/2, x2=M2/(1-Ȧ)·ǻI and y2=M1/Ȧ·ǻI. 
 
(1) When 1I M' !ǔ , 2(1 ) I M ' !ǔ , we get 
10 / 1M I  ' ǔ , 20 / (1 ) 1M I  ' ǔ , and the point 
2 1( , )
(1 )
M M
I I  '  'ǔ ǔ  locates in the plane 
{( , );0 , 1}x y x y d dĳ . There are five balance points 
of the replicator dynamic model: 1z ~ 5z . For the 
point 1 (0,0)z
  , we have 
 

*
2
2
0
0
x
d x
dt
and 
*
2
2
0
0
y
d y
dt  
 . According to the stability theorem for  
differential equations, the balance point 1z  is an  
 
asymptotically stable point of the replicator 
dynamics. Similarly, we can get that 4 (1,1)z
   is 
also an asymptotically stable point; 2 (0,1)z
  and
3 (1,0)z
  are instability points; 2 1
5 ( , )(1 )
M Mz
I I
    '  'ǔ ǔ
 
is a saddle point. The changing trend of the co-
opetition relationship in asymmetric game model is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
y
x
1z

2z

3z

(1,0)
(0,1) (1,1)
4z

(0,0)
5z

x
y 
A
B C
D
 
 
Figure 3. Changing trends of co-opetition relationship 
 in asymmetric game model. Notes: in case (1). 
 
According to Figure 3, we can find that the 
changing trend of relationship between logistics 
nodes depends on the initial state of the system. If 
the initial value of x is less than x* and the initial 
value of y is less than y*, the initial state of the 
system will locate in the area A and the system will 
converge to the asymptotically stable point 
1 (0,0)z
  . The relationship between logistics nodes 
will gradually end up with competition. 
 
If the initial state of the system locates in the area 
C, the system will converge to the asymptotically 
stable point 4 (1,1)z
  . The relationship between 
logistics nodes will eventually end with cooperation. 
For 1I M' !ǔ  and 2(1 ) I M ' !ǔ , we can get 
1 1 1I I M I '  !ǔ  and 2 2 2(1 )I I M I  '  !ǔ . According to 
Table 2, the income of logistics nodes reaches the 
best in this case. That is, both sides of the game 
players can obtain additional benefits by 
cooperation which is more than the investments for 
the cooperation. Therefore, the cooperation 
strategy is the best choice for each logistics node.  
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If the initial state of the system locates in the 
area B and D, the changing trend of relationship 
between logistics nodes is uncertain. It may tend 
to the area A and converge to the point 1 (0,0)z  . 
Also it may tend to the area C and converge to 
the point 4 (1,1)z
  . 
 
2) When one of the conditions 1I M' ǔ  and 
2(1 ) I M ' ǔ  is true at least, the point 
2 1( , )
(1 )
M M
I I  '  'ǔ ǔ  will locate outside of the 
plane {( , );0 , 1}x y x yM  d d . There are only four 
equilibrium points 1z
 ~ 4z
  of the system which are 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
In this case, no matter which condition 
1I M ' ǔ  or 2(1 ) I M  ' ǔ  is true, there is only 
one asymptotically stable point 1z   and the 
system will converge to 1 (0,0)z
  . It means that 
at least one side of the players’ additional 
benefits will be less than the investment for 
cooperation. Thus, the relationship between 
logistics nodes will end up with competition. In 
the regional logistics system, the total logistics 
income of all the logistics nodes can’t reach the 
maximum. 
 
y
x1
z
2z

3z

(1,0)
(0,1) (1,1)
4z

(0,0)  
 
Figure 4. Changing trends of co-opetition relationship 
 in asymmetric game model. Notes: in case (2). 
 
4. A case study 
 
In order to show the rationality and effectiveness of 
the proposed models, we test our models by 
analyzing the logistics system of the new Eurasian 
Continental Bridge (within Chinese territory). A 
three-layer logistics network including 42 cities 
from 10 provinces is shown in Table 3.  
 
4.1 A case study of symmetric game model 
 
Two cities in Table 3 are randomly arranged, i.e., 
Lianyungang and Xi’an. The municipal 
governments of them signed a cooperation 
agreement with each other on April 5th, 2012. 
 
Layer Logistics Nodes 
Layer I Lianyungang, Xuzhou, Zhengzhou, Xi'an, Lanzhou and Urumchi 
Layer II 
Rizhao, Nanjing , Hefei, Taiyuan, 
Luoyang, Nanyang, Yan'an, Xianyang, 
Yinchuan, Sining, Jiayuguan, Golmud, 
Hami, Turpan, Korla and Alataw Pass 
Layer III 
Jiangyin, Huainan, Yanzhou, Jinan, 
Shangqiu, Fuyang, Changzhi, Yulin, 
Hanzhong, Baoji, Tianshui, Wuwei, 
Jinchang, Jiuquan, Yumen, Altai, 
Karamay, Yining, Kuqa and Aksu 
 
Table 3.  The logistics network of the new Eurasian 
Continental Bridge (within Chinese territory). 
 
According to Table 3, we know that both of 
them belong to Layer I and have the equal 
status. So the symmetric game model of 
logistics nodes provided in section 3.2 can be 
used to analyze the cooperative behaviors of 
Lianyungang and Xi’an. It is assumed that the 
additional logistics income caused by 
cooperation is 27 million yuan, and the 
investment for logistics cooperation of each city 
is 4.2 million yuan. Then, we can get Ȧ=1/2, I'
=27 and M=4.2. The symmetric cooperative 
game payoff matrix of Lianyungang and Xi’an is 
shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Xi’an 
cooperatio
n 
competitio
n 
Lianyungan
g 
cooperatio
n 
I+13.5-4.2 
I+13.5-4.2 
I-4.2 
I 
competitio
n 
I 
I-4.2 
I 
I 
 
Table 4.  Symmetric cooperative game  
payoff matrix of Lianyungang and Xi’an. 
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According to Table 4 and based on Eqs. 10 to 13, 
we can get the replicator dynamics equation 
between Lianyungang and Xi’an is: 
   1 13.5 4.2 0x x x   . Three singularities can 
be gained: 1 0x
  , 2 1x  and 3 0.31x  , in which 1x 
and 2x   are asymptotically stable points, 3x
  is a 
saddle point. If the initial state of the system x is 
between 3 2( , )x x  , that is, more than 31% of the 
logistics nodes choose cooperation strategies, the 
game system will converge to the steady state of 
2x
 . In this case, more and more logistics nodes will 
choose cooperation strategies. The co-opetition 
relationship between logistics nodes in Layer I will 
tend to cooperation, and vice versa. Based on the 
development data of the new Eurasian Continental 
Bridge from 2010 to 2012, the Layer I logistics 
nodes cities, i.e., Zhengzhou, Lanzhou, Urumchi 
and Lianyungang already have cooperated with 
each other. Thus, more than 83% of the logistics 
nodes in Layer I choose cooperation strategies. The 
co-opetition relationship will end up with cooperation 
and the regional logistics system can achieve the 
maximum logistics benefits. 
 
4.2 A case study of asymmetric game model 
 
A city from layer I in Table 3 and a city from layer II 
in Table 3 are randomly arranged, respectively, 
i.e., Lianyungang and Luoyang. They signed a 
cooperation agreement with each other on 
December 18th, 2008. For the cooperation, the 
government of Lianyungang paid 6.5 million yuan, 
and the government of Louyang paid 3.5 million 
yuan. The two cities come from different layers of 
the regional logistics system, so we can use the 
asymmetric game model presented in section 3.3. 
Assuming that: Ȧ=2/3, I' =18, M1=6.5 and M2=3.5. 
The asymmetric cooperative game payoff matrix of 
Lianyungang and Luoyang is shown in Table 5. 
 
 Luoyang cooperation competition 
Lianyungang 
cooperation I1+12-6.5 I2+6-3.5 
I1-6.5 
I2 
competition I1 I2-3.5 
I1 
I2 
 
Table 5.  Asymmetric cooperative game payoff matrix 
 of Lianyungang and Luoyang. 
According to Table 5 and based on Eqs. 14 to 21, 
we can get the replicator dynamics equations 
between Lianyungang and Luoyang: 
 
(1 )(12 6.5) 0
(1 )(6 3.5) 0
x x y
y y x
   
   
­®¯                                        (22) 
 
Then five singularities can be gained: 1 (0,0)z
  , 
2 (0,1)z
  , 3 (1,0)z  , 4 (1,1)z  , 5 (0.58,0.54)z  . 
According to Figure 3, we can find the point 
(0.58,0.54) locates in the plane 
{( , );0 , 1}x y x y d dĳ . And the historical data show 
that: the rate of logistics nodes who chose 
cooperation strategies within layer I was more than 
58% (x>0.58), but the rate of logistics nodes who 
selected cooperation strategy within layer II was 
less than 54% (y<0.54). So the initial state of the 
system locates in the area D of Figure 3, the 
changing trend of relationship between logistics 
nodes is uncertain. It will tend to cooperation or tend 
to competition. In this case, the logistics policies 
instituted by national government will be very 
important to the development trend of co-opetition 
relationship between regional logistics nodes. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As an important component of the regional 
logistics research, the study on co-opetition 
relationship between logistics nodes has an 
enormous effect on the regional logistics system 
development. To forecast the regional logistics 
nodes development tendency and analyze the 
affecting factors, this paper analyzed the co-
opetition relationship between logistics nodes in a 
regional logistics system. Firstly, the co-opetition 
between logistics nodes was described, and the 
cooperation and competition strategy were given. 
Then, we constructed a replicator dynamic model 
to determine the strategy sets of the logistics 
nodes. Secondly, a symmetric game model and an 
asymmetric game model of logistics nodes were 
proposed. By solving these models, we could 
forecast the changing trends of co-opetition 
relationship between logistics nodes from the 
same layer or from different layers. Finally, a case 
study was taken to verify the effectiveness of the 
models. The calculated results revealed that the 
models constructed in this paper had good 
performance in forecasting the relationship 
development tendency of logistics nodes. 
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